Arab Israeli War 1967

Arab Israeli War 1967IntroductionIsrael and Arabs have fought a number of contends after 1947. after(prenominal) the creation of Israel in 14 whitethorn 1948, Arab and Israel became front to front in 1949, 1956, and 1967 and in 1973. Among all those the state of struggle of 5 -10 June 1967 overly famous for six years war was the one of the major conflict. For Arabs it was the revenge and for Israel it was a war of survival. The outcome of war became a defeat for Arabs and victory for Israel. The entire Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights and Jordanian district west of River Jordan including Jerusalem was captured by Israel. This campaign taken as one of example in the history as decisive effects on great to enemy defenses done deep penetration in very short outcome of time. (Army command and staff collage, 2012).AimThe aim of this presentation is to analyze the conclusion making and brought out lesson learned from 1967 Arab Israel war.Historical Back argumentHistorically A rabs and Jews are sprung from the prophets Ismael and Issac both sons of prophet Abraham. Prophet Ismael is believed to be the ancestor of the Arabs while Prophet Issac became the ancestor of Jews. So for both the Palestine is holy land.The creation of Israel on 14 May 1948 was the main cause between Jews and Arabs conflicts. Arabs considered the creation of Israel as an independent sphere of influence is plot against the people of Palestine by the Europeans and Americans.In 1956 Israel attack Egypt with the support of Britain and France to open Suez Canal. They occupied Gaza strip and large part of Sinai but left the area because of international pressure and 1967 war was taken as a sequel to these conflicts.Major concomitantors for the 1967 conflictafter the 1956 war there are many issues arises in this area. Arabs are looking to revenge for their loss in 1956 and for Israel it was always the survival after its creation. According to Rowman Littlefield (2000) some of the impo rtant factors, which contributed directly towards escalation of 1967 conflict, are as followsa. Refusal of Arabs to secern Israel as independent state.Increasing activities of Palestinian guerrillas Al- FATEH against Israel.b. Withdrawal of United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) on 19 May 1967 that increased the already existing strain between Egypt and Israel.c. The Mutual Defense Pact signed by Egypt and Syria in 4 Nov 1966 and Jordan Egypt Defense Agreement on 30 May 1967 that strategically peril the Israeld. Closing of Channels of Tiran that cut off the Israeli access to Red sea. On which the Israelis immediately responded with a pre-emptive attack on June 5, 1967 that is starting of famous six-day war. prove the 1967 WarShort six days war of 1967 change the big boundary in the Middle East. After this war Israelis strategic situation had changed and they became to a greater extent stronger where as the Arabs faces the humiliating loss. Different historians analyzed this war i n their different way. Army command and staff collage (2012) analyzed this six days war as follows.ArabsNational Aim/Objectives Arabs had set for themselves the aim of achieving political victory over Israel. To achieve this, they signed defense pacts among themselves and planned to give economic, political, psychological and military machine pressure to Israel.National dodging Ever since the creation of the Israel as independent State, the Arabs national strategy is the destruction of it and creation of an independent Palestine.Military dodging The Arabs had no loathsome intention at the outset. Their total emphasis was on achieving a political victory and preventing Israel from going to war. Therefore, their military strategy was(1) Deterrence through troops concentration helping guerrilla activity and playing the card of Crush Israel, in the Arab world.(2) Force mobilization for long duration and closing of straits of Tiran, which Israel could not able to afford.(3) If war i s imposed, force Israel to fight war on three fronts, all from Sinai, Jordan and Syria.Centre of Gravity Arabs identified Israel Defense forces as the concentre of gravity. But they failed to notice that within these their strength lay in their mobility.Concept of Operationa. War on more than two fronts to keep Israelis committed in all directions.b. Initiate actions like forward concentration, guerrilla activities and closing of Straits of Tiran which will force Israel either to submit or attack the Arabs, which is politically advantageous for Arabs.c. If the war starts, involve Israel in long-drawn war of attrition and exploit their numerical inferiority.IsraelNational Aim/Objectives The national aim of Israel was the survival and defense of their homeland. Their strategic fancy has been to avoid war but if a war is imposed they were to go for a quick and decisive war.National Strategy Israel had the national aim of ensuring the reign and territorial integrity of their country b y employing all possible instruments of national power like military, political and diplomatic.Military Strategy Israel military objective was offensive against Arabs for defense of their homeland. Therefore there military strategy was(1) Surprise Arabs both at strategic and tactical level to lure them into a false ace of complacency.(2) Undertake a pre-emptive air bear on to achieve complete air superiority over Sinai.(3) Undertake a pre-emptive ground offensive too.(a) Fight the war on enemy territory and seek decisive battle on their soil.(b) Have a short and decided war destroying the Egyptian forces in Sinai.(c) If Jordan and Syria also enter the war, then capture strategic objectives of West Bank of River Jordan and the Golan Heights.Center of Gravity Israelis rightly identified that within the three Arab countries the center of gravity displace in Egypt especially its armed forces. Once Egyptian Army Is destroyed, Syria and Jordan could never initiate an offensive on their own. They accordingly dealt with the Egyptian air and ground forces runner deferring Syria and Jordan for the time being.Concept of OperationEmployment of all conceivable political and psychological measures to give an impression to Arabs that Israel had been outwitted in time and space and was not in a position to under-take a major offensive.Having completely deceived the Arabs, acquire complete air superiority by under taking a pre-emptive air strike against Egyptian air bases followed by similar strikes against Jordanian and Syrian air bases.Appreciating that center of gravity lay with Egyptian Army in Sinai, Israelis decided to necessitate a swift dislocation of Egyptian defenses by breaking-through the critical triangle of Rafah, EI-Arish and Abu Agheila, isolate them and then carry-out destruction of the trapped enemy.Maintain initially a antiaircraft posture against Syria and Jordan. And after secured and destroy the Egyptian side in the Sinai, concentrate forces against Jordan and Syria.Main Reason of Loss/Achievement of WarFailure menace recognition by Arabs There are full of examples in history that whenever a nation or a commander failure to calculate the capabilities and intentions of the enemys he had to pay heavy price. Same here the Arabs completely misread Israeli reactions, in-spite of there own provocative actions. They failed to perceive the inherent mobility of Israeli ground forces and went wrong in their appreciation that they would be able to involve Israel into a long-drawn war of attrition on their three successive defense lines which Israel couldnt manage.Strategy of Pre-emption by Israelis Fully conscious vulnerability due to lack of strategic depth and multi-directional threat from Arab states, Israel had well prepared to use the option of pre-emption. Israelis knew that it would be difficult to destroy Arabs in full front war without taking initial initiative. So that they use the strategy of pre-emption for which they are f ully prepared.Lessons LearntThreat Perception The correct visualization of enemy was very important to gain initiative in war which the Arabs failed resulting loss in war.Surprise Surprise at strategic as well as tactical level in war is very key to achieve success. In spite of inferior in number and equipment Israeli achieve success because of there surprise not only lies on the military but at political leadership as well.Strategy of Pre-emption Israels strategy of pre-emption adequately showed the importance of this strategy especially for a force inferior in number and equipment. reproduction High standard mission oriented training can bring amazing results. Training is the only aspect by which one can trigger the quantitative superiority of enemy as shown by Israelis in this war.Intelligence Correct intelligence about enemy intents, capabilities and preparation has always been of paramount importance. This fact was further highlighted by these wars.Decision Theories in 1967 in WarCognitive performance As crisis induced stress grows up and need of more efficient decision making authority and bold leadership. When stress was low, Israelis decision makers evaluated all courses properly and made decisions for their interest. And their stress increased after closing of straits, which was perceived as a threat to their basic values. During this situation also Israels decision makers were psychologically prone to reliance on past experience, which created a greater abstract rigidity as a guide to coping with current threats to basic values. They seemed to be acutely aware of their complex environment. Increasing stress and fatigue during this crisis did not weaken their dimension of cognitive performance. (Brecher and Geist ,1980).Focus on immediate objectives We find that Israelis decision makers gave more attention to immediate than long-term objectives in this 1967 crisis. Like countering the finish of the Straits, withdrawal of UNEF and Arabs military bu ild up. But long-term goals and interests influenced all the decisions taken after the crisis. Brecher and Geist (1980) clustered the decisions into five stress phases corresponding to time periods. Which are lucubrate in table below.S.N. filter PhasesTime PeriodsDecisions Taken1Low pains PhaseBefore 17 MayIssue a threat of retaliation against Syria 7 MayPlace the IDF on alert 15 MayLimited mobilization 16 May2Rising Stress Phase1722 May 1967Order further mobilization of IDF reserves 17 MayInstitute large scale mobilization 19 MayShift IDF from defensive to offensive posture 19 MayAuthorize the mobilization decision 21 May3Higher Stress Phase23-27 May 1967Postpone decision on military response to Egypts massing of troops- 23 MaySend Foreign Minister to U.S.- 23 MayWarn the U.S. that an Egyptian attack was imminentAwait Foreign Ministers report on his discussions in Paris, London, and Washington- 26 May4Highest Stress Phase28 May- 4 JuneDelay pre-emptive decision again- 28 M ayRenew the IDF alert- 28 MaySend Director of Counter Intelligence to U.S.- 30 May make believe a National Unity Government- 1 JuneCrystalize military plans 2 JuneLaunch pre-emptive air strike 4 June5Declining Stress PhaseAfter 4 JuneWarn Jordan against military intervention 5 JuneDelay attack on Jerusalems grizzly City 5 JuneEncircle the Old City 6 JuneEnter to Old City- 7 JuneHalt IDF advance east of the Canal 7 JuneNot to cross Syrian border 7 JuneDelay attack on Syria -8 JuneScale the Golan Heights 9 JuneAccept cease fire 10 JuneRational Theory Rational choice hypothesis provides decision-makers choose their best options for their interest. It tell us that when faced with risk, decision makers consider the expected values and probabilities of possible outcomes and choose the option with the highest value. For Israel and Egypt, those periods were a turbulent period of international relations. During those times both Israel and Egypt were constantly faced with risky dec isions while at the brink of war. The decisions made by these two states, specifically the decisions to go to war, were sometimes unexpected and unexplainable given current models of rational choice. (Kelly, 2008).ConclusionAlthough the 1967 Arab Israel war was limited type of war happened only for six days, it has been the favorite subjects for military historians. This war gives real picture of saying Offense is best form of Defense. This war shows how leadership, wills, motivation and training count in war in spite of technology. propagationArmy Command and Staff Collage. (2012). Military invoice Primer. 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